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The Separation of Facts and Values
Arthur Kantrowitz*
During the Renaissance science fought for and won a degree of
independence. It then became possible to state facts even when they
were uncomfortable to arbiters of values (e.g., that the earth was not the
center of the universe). Independent science flourished, and its
cumulative power dispelled the traditional pessimistic view of what
humanity could accomplish in this world. The rapid expansion of
knowledge gave rise to the wonderful optimism of the Enlightenment
epitomized by the idea of progress. When science joined hands with
technology, productivity and social progress such as the world had
never seen became possible. Optimism can be a self fulfilling prophesy.
World War II exhibited science's importance in policy and made
policy important in science. With this, its independence was
dramatically reduced. By controlling funding, policy makers reduce
freedom to choose areas of concentration. But more important is the
lack of control over information addressed to the public that claims the
credibility that science had earned. Today, anyone claiming to be a
scientist can hijack that credibility, and hijackers will be heard if facts
asserted advance the purposes of those who control media access. Thus,
Lysenko's genetics advanced Stalin's visions, and the Malthusian
"Limits to Growth" enhanced the self importance of those who felt
displaced from center stage by science-based technology. With the
dependence of science on arbiters of values, a pessimism reminiscent of
that which prevailed before the independence of science, returned. And
pessimism is also a self fulfilling prophesy.
It may be useful in understanding today's pessimism to look at the
work of one of the most celebrated pessimists, the Rev. Thomas
Malthus. He regarded the idea of progress and the Enlightenment
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notion of the perfectibility of man as blasphemous. His 1798 tract

against William Pitt's socially progressive "poor laws" depended on his
observation that population growth was inevitably limited by food
supply. His observations were useful to both Darwin and Wallace in
their understanding of the mechanism of evolution. Although Malthus
was generally correct, he was dead wrong about the particular
population for which he predicted mass starvation, namely England in
the Industrial Revolution. He based his prediction on postulates that
the "utmost" increase of the food supply would be arithmetic while the
population would grow exponentially. In Chapter 5, he proclaimed:
the absolute impossibility from the fixed laws of our nature,
that the pressure of want can ever be completely removed
from the lower classes of society.
Malthus could not foresee the unprecedented growth of England's
industrial and agricultural power that emerging science-based
technology made possible. He also did not foresee that with increasing
wealth and general education the birth rate would drop.
But that is just the point. Malthus could not foresee all of
humanity's responses to a new challenge, especially when new
technology multiplies options. His pretension to prophecy was written
in defense of his faith against the inroads of social progress. It was a
classic case of mixing facts and values to force an allegedly scientific
conclusion.
It is my intention to attempt an analysis of our relapse into
pessimism and to reiterate a proposal for ameliorating our fears. When
a conjecture inspires new hopes or creates new fears, action is indicated.
There is an important asymmetry between hope, that leads to actions
which will test its basis, and fear that leads to restrictions, frequently
preventing attempts at falsification. As we well know, many hopes do
not survive testing, but fears accumulate. An inventory of untested fears
has always made us vulnerable to thought control. Independent
science's greatest triumph was reduction of that vulnerability.
Scientists accept disturbing facts when repeated and varied attempts
to falsify them have failed. When the acceptance of facts is determined
by anybody's values, we depart from science. An arbiter of values must
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always consider how effectively a statement can be propagated and how
its acceptance will affect current power struggles. Arbiters of values have
always employed the asymmetry between hopes and fears in the pursuit
of power. Thus they emphasize protecting their target audiences from
unfalsifiable fears or invisible evils.
Today many of these invisible evils are presented as products of
science, and their credibility is as closely as possible tied to the
credibility of science. The resulting cacophony has raised the question
basic to today's pessimism: Which scientist do you believe?
Let's consider global warming. Jonathan Schell quotes Stephen
Schneider (one of the most prominent climate modelers):
[W]e have to offer scary scenarios, make simplified
dramatic statements, and make little mention of any doubts
we may have. Each of us must decide what the right balance
is between being effective and being honest.
Schneider's mixing of facts and values has paid off:1
Schneider is a hot property these days - so hot that at
least four universities have been trying to recruit him. They
want Schneider to help them move into a trendy - and
well funded - area of science: the study of global change.
Al Gore's recent book 2 illustrates todays pervasive pessimism. He
assembles a case for crisis by citing witnesses who appeared before
hearings he chaired. He never mentions the well-known Washington
phenomenon that witnesses who come forward to report problems, and
to ask for money to deal with them, will always vastly outnumber those
courageous enough to cast doubt on this way of making a living. Gore
goes to great lengths to heap scorn on doubters, repeatedly comparing
them to Hitler's appeasers. He never mentions that the passage of
decades has made clear that his predecessors in raising alarms have
indulged in a great deal of the kind of hyperbole to which Schneider
confessed.
Gore's chapter, "Environmentalism of the Spirit," seeks to explain
the origins of the crisis. In Francis Bacon's philosophy, that he correctly
notes played an. important role in the scientific and technological
3
revolutions, he finds the root of the evils of the 20th century. We read:
1
2
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His [Bacon's] moral confusion - the confusion at the
heart of much modern science- came from his assumption,
echoing Plato, that human intellect could safely analyze and
understand the natural world without reference to any
moral principles defining our relationship and duties to both
God and God's creation. ... The atrocities of Hitler and
Stalin, and the mechanical sins of all who helped them,
might have been inconceivable except for the separation of
facts from values and knowledge from morality.
This is a direct appeal for a return to the ages when religion
controlled. I found this indication of Gore's thinking profoundly
disturbing. Fortunately, the founding fathers, deeply conscious of such
a threat, began the First Amendment by providing that "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion ...."
Let's recall the evils of the Renaissance. When the authority of the
Church was threatened by the spread of faith in reason, the inquisition
was invented. Witchcraft was seen as a powerful strategy for
demonstrating the existence of God. Torture provided thousands of
notarized confessions attesting to the reality of the devil and thus to the
reality of the God the arbiters of value needed to enforce control.
Mixing facts and values extends the decision maker's power. If we
do not separate the power to state the facts from the power to decide
what is to be done, then arbiters of value will be tempted to defend
their policies with factual statements biased to make those policies seem
consistent with the values of their audience. This 'temptation is
especially strong when the audience has no first-hand knowledge.
Conflicting, biased, second-hand, facts are an important pollutant in
today's political rhetoric. Hiding value differences between governors
and governed, it conveys power that corrupts.
Science has lost its independence. Its status has not grown with its
appetite for funds. As the squeeze has tightened, its institutions have
become fixated on research budgets. Frank Press called raising money
for basic research "the most important activity I can undertake as
president of the National Academy of Sciences." 4 Because the NAS is a
prime source of facts needed by arbiters of values, this poses a serious
3
4
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conflict. The situation was eloquently summed up by Margaret Mead: 5
We need a new institution. There isn't any doubt about
that. The institutions we have are totally unsatisfactory. In
many cases they are not only unsatisfactory, they involve a
prostitution of the decision making process.
Developing an institution dedicated to separating what science
knows from what it wants is a major undertaking. Its purpose would be
to provide the public and its arbiters of values with facts as free as
possible from the scientists' biases. In pursuit of that end, I proposed
6
that the scientific community should enforce a new norm namely:
Any scientist who addresses the public or lay officials
on public policy matters should stand ready to publicly
answer questions not only from the public but from expert
adversaries.
The media called procedures based on this norm "Science Court"
procedures. Experience confirmed the expectation that we could reduce
self-serving noise by enforcing the norm. 7 However, this would restrict
the freedom of scientists and politicians to state the facts as they would
prefer them. Therefore it has met with resistance.
In his widely publicized "Reinventing Government," the Vice
President notes that "Many Regulatory decisions made by federal
agencies are founded on scientific judgements." After describing how
such judgements are made, he notes "This process is understandably
regarded as deficient among scientists who follow the regulatory
process." 8 He then briefly discusses and dismisses the Science Court
"largely because it is doubtful that scientific and policy issues can be
separated - in part because the process of defining the problem is
often subjective and frequently laden with political considerations" He
recommends that agencies "Create science advisory boards." 9
Philosophers have discussed the separability of facts and values at
5 Proceedings of the Colloquium on the Science Court 25 (1976).
6 See, e.g., my piece, Elitism vs. Checks and Balances, 4 Risk 101 (1993).
7 Kraft & Vig, Technology and Politics Ch. 13 (1988); see also Allan Mazur,
The Science Court..., 4 Risk 165 (1993).
8 Creating a Government that Works Better & Costs Less 59 (1993). See also,
Lubbers, infra, at .161.
9 Id. at60.
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least since Protagoras, Socrates and Plato (in the Meno dialog). David
Hume maintained that ought cannot be deduced from is and that
the difference "is of the last consequence."' 0 Karl Popper says:11
To sum up, It is impossible to derive a sentence stating a
norm or a decision, or say a proposal for a policy from a
sentence stating a fact.
To reach a decision after facts have been assembled, a normative
statement must be added. I would put it this way - you can better
separate facts and values if you try.
The decision to separate facts and values to the best of our ability is
itself a value judgement. Where Gore maintains that he is "doubtful," I
am convinced he should have said that he does not wish to make the
separation. He makes this very clear when he recommends regulatory
Science Advisory Boards that will presumably not confine themselves to
matters of fact. Whose values will they represent? Thus scientists willing
to serve political purposes will also acquire power that corrupts.
When our values demand action before general agreement on facts
has been achieved, we must base action on an interim statement of the
,facts. However, it is important to remember the uncertainties and not
to consider the issue closed. When a political decision has been made,
those who favored that decision will maintain a vested interest in its
preservation. That interest could be challenged by advancing
knowledge. Burying ignorance in political compromise conceals
important avenues for advancing the knowledge needed to live in our
world.
Among facts that must not be buried, the most important are
acknowledgements of what science does not yet know. If we can
defend science's separation from religions old and new, science-based
technology will retain the enormous power it has exhibited for centuries
as part of a grand optimistic strategy for widening our horizons, doing
our work, healing our sick, protecting our environment and
empowering open societies.

10 A Treatise on Human Nature (1739).
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